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IN DEFENSE OF SIMONIAN SCIENCE
David Diekema and Patrick McDonald
In his recent book Where the Conflict Really Lies, Alvin Plantinga articulates 
a number of arguments about the conceptual relationship between science 
and faith, especially Christian faith. He uses Herbert Simon’s evolutionary 
account of altruism and David Sloan Wilson’s evolutionary account of reli-
gion as exemplars of theories that are in genuine but superficial conflict with 
Christian faith. This paper argues that any conflict between Christian faith and 
evolutionary psychology or Simonian science is even more superficial than 
Plantinga himself admits. We argue that apparent conflicts between Christian 
control beliefs and social scientific theorizing are due predominantly to (1) 
misunderstanding the scope of a theory (or the terms used in a theory) or (2) 
metatheoretical overreaching on the part of one side or the other. Specifically, 
the apparent conflict between Simon’s account and Christian faith is rooted in 
a misunderstanding of Simon’s limited definitions of rationality and altruism. 
The apparent conflict between Wilson’s account and Christian faith is a result 
of failing to distinguish Wilson’s broader metatheoretical commitments from 
the more limited scope of his scientific theory of religion.
There have been numerous calls for Christian scholars to relate their faith 
beliefs directly to their scholarship.1 Alvin Plantinga, among others, sug-
gests that the behavioral sciences are one area where Christian control 
beliefs2 are likely to have a significant impact.3 This is presumably because 
much of what goes on in the human sciences is not neutral with regard 
to religious beliefs and often proceeds on the basis of metaphysical or 
1See for example Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion; Marsden, The Outra-
geous Idea of Christian Scholarship; Plantinga, The Twin Pillars of Christian Scholarship; and Van 
Leeuwen, The Sorcerer’s Apprentice.
2Christian control beliefs are those central tenets of the Christian faith that operate as basic 
background beliefs, and that are taken to control the direction of one’s metatheorizing and 
theorizing in one’s respective discipline (Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion, 67).
3Plantinga, Twin Pillars of Christian Scholarship, 60; “Methodological Naturalism, Part 
1,” 12. See also Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism, Part 2”; Evans, “Christian Perspec-
tives on the Sciences of Man”; Evans, Preserving the Person; Evans, Wisdom and Humanness in 
Psychology; Van Leeuwen, The Person in Psychology; Gaede, Where Gods May Dwell; Perkins, 
Looking Both Ways; Jeeves, Psychology and Christianity; Myers, The Human Puzzle; and Lyon, 
Christians and Sociology.
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metatheoretical4 assumptions that are quite opposed to religious beliefs.5 
In his most recent book, Where the Conflict Really Lies, Plantinga argues 
that there are some cases of genuine conflict between religion and science. 
While ultimately these are considered to be superficial conflicts, in that 
they do not provide defeaters for Christian or theistic belief, they are non-
trivial in the sense that a Christian will want to reject those theories that 
are in real, direct conflict with theses (knowledge) that Christians accept 
on the basis of their broader knowledge structure.
Two examples of theories in conflict with Christian control beliefs, 
suggests Plantinga, are Herbert Simon’s evolutionarily-driven rational 
choice theory of altruism and David Sloan Wilson’s evolutionary account 
of religion.6 Plantinga uses Simon’s work, in particular, as an exemplar or 
placeholder for theories that are in at least superficial, if not deep, conflict 
with Christian control beliefs.
[S]ome scientific theories or claims—theories or claims taken from evolu-
tionary psychology and historical Biblical criticism—do indeed conflict with 
Christian (and Muslim and Jewish) belief. Evolutionary psychologists have 
come up with a number of theories that are wholly incompatible with Chris-
tian beliefs: theories purporting to explain altruism in terms of unusual do-
cility and limited rationality, morality as an illusion fobbed off on us by our 
genes, and religion itself as involving belief that is false. . . . [E]volutionary 
psychology contains many widely accepted theories and claims that (at least 
as they stand) are in conflict with Christian belief. And let’s call scientific 
theories incompatible with Christian belief Simonian science, in honor of 
Herbert Simon and his theory of altruism.7
It might be instructive to take a close look at both the Simon case and 
the Wilson case to examine the extent to which there is even a superficial 
conflict between these theories and Christian control beliefs.
This paper will argue that any conflict between Christian faith and evo-
lutionary psychology or Simonian science is even more superficial than 
Plantinga himself argues. Specifically, we will argue that the apparent con-
flict Plantinga sees between Simon’s account of altruism and Christian faith 
is rooted in a misunderstanding of the way Simon is defining rationality 
and altruism. When this misunderstanding is resolved, the appearance of 
conflict dissolves. We will then argue that the apparent conflict Plantinga 
sees between Wilson’s account of religion and Christian faith is rooted at the 
metatheoretical level, and once unnecessary metatheoretical assumptions 
4There are several definitions of metatheory in the social sciences. For the purposes of 
this paper, metatheory will be used to designate any assertions, background assumptions, 
metaphysical claims, etc. that are non-essential to the particular scientific theory in question. 
For the most part these are claims or assumptions that are not taken as testable and provide 
a more general interpretive framework for placing a particular theoretical explanation.
5Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism, Part 1,” 2.
6Simon, “A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism”; Wilson, Darwin’s 
Cathedral.
7Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 163–164.
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are eliminated from Wilson’s scientific theory proper, no conflict exists. We 
argue more generally that apparent conflicts between Christian control 
beliefs and social scientific theorizing are due predominantly to these two 
general issues: (1) misunderstanding the limited scope of scientific theories 
and the terms used in such theories or (2) failing to properly disentangle 
those statements essential to a scientific theory proper and those statements 
that make up the general metatheoretical framework of the scientist/theorist 
in question. We argue that if science is done properly, and is properly evalu-
ated, the two cases of science-religion conflict identified by Plantinga are 
not cases of conflict at all. In fact, Simon’s theory and Wilson’s theory may 
actually exemplify a deep concord between religion and science. Assuming 
Plantinga picked two potentially strong cases of real conflict between reli-
gion and science to make his case, this raises the question as to whether the 
set of scientific theories actually in conflict with Christian belief is, in fact, 
an empty set.
The Simon Case
The question Simon addresses is: can neo-Darwinian science adequately 
account for the presence (and presumably, the persistence) of altruism on 
a substantial scale in human societies? Important here is that Simon de-
fines altruism in purely genetic terms:
By altruism I mean behavior that increases, on average, the reproductive 
fitness of others at the expense of the fitness of the altruist. Fitness simply 
means expected number of progeny. . . . 
Notice that “altruism” and “selfishness” in genetics bear no close resem-
blance to these terms in everyday language.8
So how do we account for the behavior of people like Mother Teresa who 
devote their lives to the welfare of others, when the rational way to act is to 
increase one’s personal fitness, i.e., egoistically, thus increasing the likeli-
hood that one’s genes will be disseminated into the next generation?9 Of 
course, the underlying mechanisms involved in this egoistic tendency are 
unlikely to be fully conscious. Rather they are likely to function as drives 
(e.g., the “sex drive”) or as behavioral tendencies rooted in temperament, 
emotion, preferences, etc. But, in any case, for a rational choice theorist 
or evolutionary behavioral scientist, altruism becomes a “problem” to be 
explained. That is, it is behavior that would seem to run counter to the 
natural tendency of self-preservation and propagation of one’s genes.
Simon’s explanation of the Mother Teresas of the world involves the 
concepts of “docility” and “bounded rationality.” Docility is the tendency 
of some individuals to conform to society’s expectations of them without 
8Simon, “A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism,” 1665.
9The terms “rational” and “egoistic” are used in highly circumscribed ways as well. “Ra-
tional” would be defined in terms of a particular outcome and/or preference structure—in 
this case, amassing progeny. “Egoistic” as well would be defined in terms of behavior that is 
narrowly focused on protecting one’s genetic lineage.
77IN DEFENSE OF SIMONIAN SCIENCE
fully thinking through the implications for personal fitness. Bounded 
rationality is actually a more general concept that would incorporate do-
cility. Bounded rationality refers simply to the general fact that people 
often do behave in “irrational” ways, in that they do not behave optimally 
because of imperfect or incomplete information, imperfect information 
processing, normative constraints, cognitive shortcuts, etc. The empir-
ical and theoretical investigation of bounded rationality has blossomed 
in recent years and is coming to play a much larger role in economics, 
psychology, and sociology when discussing human decision-making and 
action. Bounded rationality does not imply a negligent irrationality on the 
part of the actor. Rather, it simply recognizes the inherent limitations on 
rational thought rooted both in the individual organism (cognitive limita-
tions) and the environment (lack of quality information, time pressures, 
etc.). In any case, the Mother Teresas of the world, as a result of docility 
and generally bounded rationality, behave less than optimally in regard to 
gene propagation. Hence, on Simon’s theory, Mother Teresa behaved in a 
sub-optimal and, hence, less than perfectly rational way.
Plantinga argues that such an explanation is anathema to the Christian 
perspective. Simon’s theory of altruism is a prime example of how science 
is anything but religiously neutral. Here is Plantinga’s argument in his 
own words:
No Christian could accept this account as even a beginning of a viable expla-
nation of the altruistic behavior of the Mother Teresas of the world. From a 
Christian perspective this doesn’t even miss the mark; it isn’t close enough to 
be a miss. Behaving as Mother Teresa does is not a display of bounded ratio-
nality—as if, if she thought through the matter with greater clarity and pen-
etration, she would cease this kind of behavior and instead turn her atten-
tion to her expected number of progeny. Her behavior displays a Christ-like 
spirit; she is reflecting in her limited human way the magnificent splendor 
of Christ’s sacrificial action in the atonement. (No doubt she is also laying 
up treasure in heaven.) Indeed, is there anything a human being can do that 
is more rational than what she does? From a Christian perspective, the idea 
that her behavior is irrational (and so irrational that it needs to be explained 
in terms of such mechanisms as unusual docility and limited rationality!) is 
hard to take seriously. From that perspective, behavior of the sort engaged in 
by Mother Teresa is anything but a manifestation of “limited rationality.”10
Plantinga suggests that to propose that people like Mother Teresa have 
the trait of docility and bounded rationality, as Simon does, implies that 
they are somehow defective, unintelligent, and lack acuity—“this limited 
rationality is a matter of running a quart low, of playing with less than a 
full deck, of being such that the elevator doesn’t go all the way to the top 
floor.”11 He also suggests that when Simon assumes that the rational course 
of action is to strive to promote fitness, he is using the term “rational” to 
10Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism, Part 1,” 3.
11Ibid.
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mean “properly functioning,” such that a properly functioning human 
being (i.e., one who is not insane, under undue stress, or defective in some 
other way) will have as one of his or her goals or motivations to promote 
or maximize fitness. As such, this use of “rational” as involving proper 
functioning is a normative use of the term.
Rationality, however, is a deeply normative notion; the rational course is the 
right course, the one to be recommended, the one you ought to pursue. 
Simon, therefore, seems to be making a normative claim, or perhaps a nor-
mative assumption; it is a vital and intrinsic part of what he means to put 
forward.12
On Plantinga’s reading, Simon’s account assumes that a properly func-
tioning human being ought to behave in a way that promotes fitness. This 
assumption flies directly in the face of Christian control beliefs and, as 
such, Simon’s account is inconsistent with Christian belief.13 To be fair, 
in Where the Conflict Really Lies, Plantinga is somewhat less harsh with 
Simon, but re-asserts his substantive claims.
But is Simon’s theory really in conflict with Christian beliefs? A fair in-
terpretation of Simon may actually suggest a deep concordance between 
Simon’s account and Christian belief.14 As stated earlier, Simon has a very 
narrow, genetic definition of altruism, one based on expected progeny. 
When Plantinga states, “Why, asks Simon, do people like Mother Teresa 
do the things they do? Why do they devote their time and energy and 
indeed their entire lives to the welfare of other people?,”15 he seems to 
be misinterpreting the question Simon is actually asking. Simon’s ques-
tion would be more the following: Given that devoting one’s life to the 
welfare of others is likely to be costly in terms of reproductive success (i.e., 
in moving one’s genes into the next generation), and given that altruism 
likely has some genetic basis, as would selfishness or egoism, how is it that 
altruism continues to show up in human societies, i.e., why is altruism not 
selected out by evolutionary pressure?16 In Simon’s own words:
In any event, our goal is not to establish how much or how little altruism, 
in either sense, there is in human behavior, but rather to show that altruism 
on a substantial scale is not inconsistent with the strictest neo-Darwinian 
assumptions.17
12Ibid.
13Ibid., 5.
14This paper makes no claim about the scientific validity of Simon’s theory. The question 
being addressed is simply whether or not it is in conflict with Christian beliefs.
15Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism, Part 1,” 2.
16See Rushton et al., “Altruism and Aggression.” What is inherited is, of course, open to 
question. Altruism is not a specific behavior pattern likely to be controlled by a single gene 
or even a gene that is directly linked to a particular behavioral tendency. What is inherited 
is likely to be something more diffuse, such as the tendency to empathize with others, or 
docility, or norm internalization.
17Simon, “A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism,” 1665.
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On a neo-Darwinian account, if altruism involved significant costs in 
terms of fitness, i.e., reproductive success, then it would be eliminated. 
The issue is not so much an account of the underlying motivation for the 
individual (e.g., is a particular altruistic behavior or lifestyle motivated by 
devotion to God, by selfishness, or by lack of mental acuity), but rather 
why a behavior pattern continues to exist in a society (or population) that 
would appear, on the face of it, to make one less genetically fit.
It is important to keep in mind here that genetic altruism has at most 
partial overlap with what we ordinarily think altruism to be, or for that 
matter, selfishness. What may appear to be very selfish behavior in terms 
of everyday definitions of selfishness would count as altruism on Simon’s 
definition. On Simon’s account, working day and night for the good of one’s 
company, and at the same time for the good of one’s paycheck in terms of 
increased wages, would be construed as altruistic to the extent that it de-
creased the time and energy available for reproduction for oneself relative 
to others. At the same time, giving large donations to various charities may 
actually be very selfish behavior to the extent it makes one more attractive 
and provides opportunities to meet new potential sexual partners.
A proper evaluation of Simon’s theory requires us to see his theory 
for what it is: an attempt to demonstrate that altruism, as defined nar-
rowly in terms of its impact on genetic fitness, is not inconsistent with a 
neo-Darwinian account of human evolution. Is this attempt somehow in-
consistent with a Christian worldview? Let’s take a closer look at Simon’s 
account as we answer this question.
As it turns out, Simon’s model of altruism actually assumes that altru-
ists, by and large, are fitter than selfish individuals. Why are they fitter? 
Not because of their altruistic behavior, but because of their docility.18 Do-
cility as defined by Simon is the disposition to be taught. That is, a docile 
individual is one who is highly teachable or especially adept at social 
learning. Hence, a docile individual is better able to learn social norms and 
expectations among other things, such as job or academic skills. Docility 
in combination with bounded rationality implies that individuals will 
be more likely to rely on social teachings than on their own independent 
evaluation of the facts or by independently figuring things out. Docility, 
then, will often contribute to fitness: a docile individual will not have to 
touch a hot stove to learn that such behavior is unwise, will not have to 
try dangerous drugs to determine that they have negative cognitive and 
behavioral consequences, and will be more likely to study hard in school 
because her parents tell her it is the way to a successful life. Docility com-
bined with bounded rationality, then, is a good thing (at least within certain 
limits). It makes one more fit. Hence, on Simon’s model, docile individuals 
18On Simon’s account, docility is what is being selected for at the individual level, not 
altruism. This is very important to keep in mind. The argument is not that altruism increases 
fitness, but that docility does. Altruism can be seen as piggybacking on other internalized 
norms that do increase the fitness of the individual. This argument can be seen in Gintis, 
“The Hitchhiker’s Guide to Altruism.”
80 Faith and Philosophy
will be more likely to have progeny and, hence, move their genes into the 
next generation.
On Simon’s account, altruism becomes a tax that is able to be imposed 
on docile individuals because of their tendency to learn what society 
wants them to learn combined with bounded rationality, the difficulty 
or impossibility of evaluating beliefs for all their potential contributions 
to fitness. Societies that impose this tax, i.e., that instill altruism in their 
docile members, should be more successful than societies that do not im-
pose such a tax and, hence, should be at an evolutionary advantage.
A society that instilled such behaviors [altruistic] in its docile members 
would grow more rapidly than one that did not; hence such behaviors 
would become, by evolution at the social level, a part of the repertory of 
proper behaviors of successful societies. Societies that did not develop such 
a repertory would be less fit than those that did, and would ultimately dis-
appear.19
This assumes, of course, that the altruism being taught has a greater cor-
responding advantage for other individuals in the society than the costs 
to fitness of the altruistic individual. But the question remains whether 
altruism could ultimately survive within these more successful societies 
if it is costly to the individual reproductive success of the altruist. Simon’s 
answer is that as long as the costs imposed on docile individuals by the 
altruistic demands of society are lower than the advantages accrued by the 
skills and knowledge acquired through docility, the proportion of altruists 
in a society should increase.20
[T]he fitness of altruists will actually exceed the fitness of selfish individuals 
as long as d [the gross increase in offspring due to docility] exceeds c [the net 
cost in offspring of altruistic behavior acquired through docility], that is, as 
long as the demands for altruism that society imposes on docile individuals 
are not excessive compared with the advantageous knowledge and skills 
acquired through docility.21
Successful societies will adjust the altruistic demands placed on docile 
members so as to keep the altruistic costs to fitness far enough below the 
reproductive benefits of docility in order to ensure that docility will be 
maintained at functional levels within the society.
Now Simon does assume, as Plantinga points out, that if individuals 
could discriminate between “proper” or “socially accepted” behavior that 
is personally beneficial vs. altruistic, they may be inclined to opt for the 
19Simon, “A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism,” 1667.
20Of course, extreme forms of altruism, from a genetic standpoint, will not be fitness-
enhancing. Mother Teresa would be an exemplar of this extreme form of altruism. But 
presumably societies with at least some Mother Teresas would be better off than societies 
with none. This would be true to the extent that Mother Teresa’s failure to reproduce is com-
pensated at the group level by the increase in reproduction afforded by her contributions 
to others. And to the extent that altruism is at least indirectly a genetic trait, the number of 
Mother Teresas in any society should be quite small.
21Simon, “A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism,” 1667.
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personally beneficial behavior. But the amount of time and energy required 
to make such distinctions would offset the benefits of docility. Hence, again 
docility is not seen to be a defect, a negative trait or an indication of lack 
of intelligence.22 It is rather a personally and socially beneficial trait. What 
this basically boils down to is this: docile individuals will be more likely 
to accept social norms and socially prescribed admonitions to help others 
over purely self-interested, egoistic behaviors. And as it turns out, docility, 
even given the corresponding “costs” to fitness involved in the altruistic 
behaviors that often result from docility, actually increases (on balance) 
the fitness of both the individual and the society. So in terms of normative 
claims, it can hardly be said that being perfectly rational, if that is defined 
as being fully egoistic, is a good thing or the right course to take, or the path 
one ought to pursue. At least, this is not the case with Simon’s model.23
A significant sticking point between Plantinga and Simon seemingly re-
volves around the use of the concept “rationality.” Plantinga reads Simon 
as making normative claims when he talks about actors making rational 
decisions. But Simon is using “rationality” purely descriptively. More spe-
cifically, Simon uses “rationality” in the way economists and behavioral 
scientists typically employ that term in the context of their theories ex-
plaining human choices. In this tradition, “rational” behavior is that which 
maximizes the likelihood of a given goal or outcome at minimal cost. What 
is considered rational in any given situation is dependent on the actor’s 
preference structure which ordinally ranks the goals or outcomes being 
pursued and the cost structure perceived to be operative in that situation. 
Preference structures can change, can differ across individuals, and can be 
conscious or non-conscious.
On Simon’s theory, high on any organism’s preference structure (in-
cluding humans) will be reproduction (expected number of progeny) as 
this is what is required for an organism to be genetically successful. Those 
organisms unsuccessful at reproduction were not among our ancestors. 
Of course, reproduction will not necessarily be consciously high on an 
individual’s preference structure, but many behaviors that ultimately may 
lead to reproduction are likely to be so—such as the desire to acquire and 
display objects of high social value (e.g., expensive cars, high-end elec-
tronics, etc.).
As stated, it is easy to see how a preference structure that values close-
ness to God could conflict with a preference structure that values expected 
number of progeny. What is considered a rational course of action on one 
preference structure is, in some cases, likely to conflict with what would 
be a rational course on the other. Simon’s theory simply recognizes that a 
22In fact, on Simon’s theory, docility should be correlated with intelligence.
23This is similar to Robert Frank’s argument that to behave in a purely self-interested way 
is often irrational in the long run. This serves as the basis for Frank’s argument regarding 
the importance of emotions in understanding human behavior and their significance for 
solving various dilemmas confronted by pure rational choice theories. See Frank, Passion 
within Reason.
82 Faith and Philosophy
preference structure that consistently leads to behavior that increases the 
reproductive fitness of others at excessive expense to oneself (i.e., where the 
net cost in offspring of altruistic behavior is greater than the gross increase 
in offspring due to docility) is unlikely to be a successful evolutionary 
strategy. As a result, the genes underlying such a preference structure 
and its corresponding behavioral patterns are unlikely to be passed on to 
future generations. As a result, such preference structures and their corre-
sponding behavioral patterns should ultimately be eliminated or become 
quite rare in human groups.
As quoted earlier, Plantinga sees Simon’s explanation of altruism as 
directly opposed to a Christian worldview. But as presented above, Si-
mon’s model does not seem to be obviously inconsistent with a Christian 
worldview, and it actually has much to say for itself from a Christian 
perspective. In fact, from a Christian perspective wouldn’t we expect the 
world God created to act like Simon’s? That is, wouldn’t we expect docility, 
and the corresponding altruism, to be rewarded? On a Christian account, 
we would expect to see the extreme sort of sacrificial altruism found in 
people like Mother Teresa, that which is actually detrimental to fitness 
and progeny, to be relatively rare, and as a result of its social benefits to be 
highly regarded by others in society. And isn’t that what we see? Further, a 
Christian might well expect egoism to compete with and be complexly in-
tertwined with altruism in a fallen world, i.e., in a world of image-bearers 
who are estranged from God.
Plantinga recognizes that altruism can be highly rational given certain 
value commitments. For the Christian, a life of altruism can have the 
highest of pay-offs—eternal life. And as it turns out, rational choice theory 
has been applied quite successfully to several problems in the sociology of 
religion. Rodney Stark has used rational choice theory to offer an explana-
tion of Christian sacrifice at perhaps its most extreme—martyrdom.24 Stark 
argues that martyrdom promised rewards not only in the world to come, 
but very often prior to the actual event. Now clearly these rewards were 
not enough to attract the vast majority of followers, just as the life-commit-
ment of a Mother Teresa is very rare. But they are enough for a select few, 
and no doubt biology, temperament, personality, and upbringing work 
together in complex ways to make one open to such avenues of sacrifice.
The Bible also seems to provide us with exemplars that are perfectly 
consistent with such a rational choice account of behavior, choice, and 
sacrifice. This is contrary to John Leightner’s recent critique of the rational 
choice model.
Clearly, there are people who profess to be Christians and who try to live a 
Christian lifestyle, but who do it to maximize their utility by escaping hell 
or gaining heaven. However, such a motivation is contrary to the teachings 
of the Bible.25
24Stark, The Rise of Christianity.
25Leightner, “Utility Versus Self-Sacrificing Love,” 320.
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But is it really contrary to Biblical teaching? Look at Jesus’ words in Matthew 
6:1–4:26
Be careful to not do your acts of righteousness before men, to be seen by 
them. If you do, you will have no reward from your Father in heaven. So 
when you give to the needy, do not announce it with trumpets, as the hypo-
crites do in the synagogues and on the streets, to be honored by men. I tell 
you the truth, they have received their reward in full. But when you give to 
the needy, do not let your left hand know what your right hand is doing, so 
that your giving may be in secret. Then your Father, who sees what is done 
in secret, will reward you.
Similarly in Luke 6:30, 31, 35:
Give to everyone who asks you, and if anyone takes what belongs to you, do 
not demand it back. Do to others as you would have them do to you. . . . But 
love your enemies, do good to them, and lend to them without expecting to 
get anything back. Then your reward will be great, and you will be sons of 
the Most High, because he is kind to the ungrateful and wicked.
We are not suggesting that Jesus is providing a normative theory of human 
behavior here—that people should help others because to do so will result 
in rewards. That is, Jesus is not suggesting people should do good only 
because it serves long-range egoistic strategies. But we do think Jesus fully 
recognizes here the fallen condition of humankind, one result of which 
is that we do tend to act egoistically, and that it is difficult to get people 
to consistently help others unless there is some pay-off. In the terms of 
behavioral economics, Jesus here is exhorting us to quit time-discounting 
and start weighing future rewards and costs more heavily than immediate 
rewards and costs. This is not much different than parents exhorting their 
children to save their money for future desires and needs (e.g., education) 
rather than spend it on some immediate pleasure that will be gone very 
quickly. And all parents know full well how difficult it is to get children 
to think this way.
The main point here is that Simon’s account does not appear to be in 
conflict with Christian beliefs in either a superficial or a deep sense. In-
stead of being seen as a potential defeater of Christian beliefs, it may in 
fact be in deep concord with a Christian worldview. Given that Simon’s 
approach is used as a placeholder by Plantinga for scientific theorizing 
that is in direct conflict with Christian beliefs, one may wonder whether 
the assumed conflict between evolutionary thinking in the behavioral sci-
ences and Christian belief is more apparent than real.
We suggest that any apparent conflict between Christian belief and 
evolutionary thinking in the social sciences is largely a result of: (1) mis-
understanding the scope and terminology of the theory (what is actually 
being claimed by the theory); or (2) the Christian or the evolutionary 
theorist importing unnecessary claims into the framework of scientific 
26All Biblical references are from the NIV.
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investigation, i.e., untestable metatheoretical claims that are irrelevant to 
the theoretical explanation of the particular issue at hand. The Simonian 
case would be an example of the former. The second case discussed by 
Plantinga in Where the Conflict Really Lies, Wilson’s evolutionary theory of 
religion, would be an example of the latter.27
The Wilson Case
In Darwin’s Cathedral, David Sloan Wilson offers an account of the origin 
and persistence of religious belief and practice from an evolutionary per-
spective. Like Simon’s approach to altruism, this can be seen as a case of 
puzzle solving. If religion were at best a useless spandrel and at worst 
dysfunctional or maladaptive, then how would one explain its near- 
universality and persistence across time and culture?28 This question 
arises in particular given that on the surface the costs of religion appear so 
steep in terms of time, money, identity, and self-sacrifice.29
Wilson’s answer here depends on a version of group selection theory 
wherein group-level adaptations can increase the fitness of both groups 
and individuals within those groups.30 In particular, Wilson’s focus is on 
the potential functional utility of religion at the level of the group. Given 
this focus, the truth-value of any claims being made is secondary to the 
adaptive properties of the religion in question, i.e., religion may or may 
not be truth-aimed in any particular case.
[A] fictional belief system can be more motivating than a realistic belief sys-
tem. . . . [A] fictional belief system can perform the same functions as exter-
nally imposed rewards and punishments, often at a much lower cost.31
It is true that many religious beliefs are false as literal descriptions of the real 
world, but this merely forces us to recognize two forms of realism; a factual 
realism based on literal correspondence and a practical realism based on 
behavioral adaptedness.32
However, it appears that factual knowledge is not always sufficient by itself 
to motivate behavior. At times a symbolic belief system that departs from 
factual reality fares better.33
A society with a factually incorrect set of religious beliefs can be as adap-
tive, if not more so, as a society with factually correct religious beliefs if 
those beliefs serve the group-level functions specified by Wilson.
27Plantinga’s focus, and our own, is on Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral.
28A spandrel is a characteristic that arises as a byproduct of the evolution of another trait. 
Gould, “The Exaptive Excellence of Spandrels as a Term and Prototype.”
29Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral, 171.
30The particular mechanisms underlying Wilson’s theory are irrelevant to the conflict per-
ceived by Plantinga. Since our concern is with Plantinga’s criticism of Wilson our focus will 
be there as opposed to the adequacy of Wilson’s account as a scientific theory.
31Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral, 99.
32Ibid., 228.
33Ibid., 229.
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Plantinga’s primary criticism of Wilson’s account of religion is that, like 
Freud’s earlier account, it assumes or states that the processes underlying 
religious belief are not truth-aimed or reality-oriented. Freud sees religious 
beliefs as primarily aimed at wish-fulfillment, while Wilson sees religious 
beliefs as primarily aimed at fitness-enhancement. Wilson argues that reli-
gious beliefs are adaptive in that they operate to increase the rate of survival 
of those groups (and those who make up such groups) that hold these be-
liefs relative to those that do not. Taken as stated, Plantinga takes Wilson’s 
theory to be in direct conflict with Christian belief, since the Christian will 
believe that those processes underlying belief formation are in fact designed 
with the end being true belief, not necessarily fitness enhancement.
If Plantinga’s account of Wilson’s theory is correct, then he is also cor-
rect that there is indeed a conflict here. To the extent that an account of 
the origin of religion, evolutionary or otherwise, assumes or explicitly 
states that such beliefs are counterfactual, false, or imaginary, then such 
an account is clearly incompatible with Christian belief. But, if Wilson is 
claiming what Plantinga suggests, then the problem is not with Wilson’s 
science as such but rather with metatheoretical overreaching on Wilson’s 
account. That is, he sneaks an unnecessary metatheoretical claim into his 
scientific theory (i.e., a claim that does no explanatory theoretical work). 
An easy fix is to simply claim that the processes underlying religious 
beliefs are not necessarily truth-aimed. And, in fact, there is good reason 
to believe that is indeed what Wilson intends.34 On such a claim it is an 
open question as to whether or not the processes underlying religious 
belief lead to true beliefs. After all, Wilson’s theory is not concerned with 
the truth-content of the beliefs in question, but rather with the social and 
adaptive functions they serve for the larger whole. A scientific explana-
tion operating within the constraints of methodological naturalism should 
be agnostic regarding the truth-value of claims about the supernatural.35 
34Ibid., 228.
35Methodological naturalism, on Plantinga’s account, is “the idea that in science we 
should proceed as if the supernatural is not given” (Where the Conflict Really Lies, 170). More 
specifically, methodological naturalism asserts that a proper data set, theory, and evidence 
base for scientific inquiry will not invoke appeals to supernatural agents, forces, or revelation 
(Where the Conflict Really Lies, 172–173). Methodological naturalism remains agnostic about 
the existence of supernatural agents, forces, or revelation as well as the truth-value of state-
ments making reference to supernatural beings or forces. It simply restricts appeals to these 
elements in the doing of science.
 Wilson is an advocate of methodological naturalism as evidenced by his statements in 
various public fora, e.g., “On the Importance of Being a Methodological Naturalist,” and 
“The Future of Religion According to the John Templeton Foundation,” In Darwin’s Cathe-
dral, Wilson characterizes science in the following way:
Science works best when a subject can be resolved into well-framed hypotheses 
that make different predictions about measurable aspects of the world (1).
And later when discussing design in nature, he states:
Thus if we are studying organisms and if we exclude special creation and alien de-
signers from other planets from consideration, we are left with design as a source 
of evidence of evolutionary adaptation (71).
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And his theory works perfectly well while remaining agnostic about the 
truth-content of the beliefs in question. All his theory needs to claim is that 
religious belief systems, and their corresponding practices, have practical 
utility that enhance the fitness of groups that possess them. That adaptive 
function is independent of the truth-value of the beliefs in question. And 
within the scope of a scientific explanation of the origin of religious beliefs, 
it is irrelevant whether such beliefs are true or false, rational or irrational.
Let us be clear. It is evident from Wilson’s text and especially his ap-
proach to the Scriptures (even more so, the Gospel narratives) that he does 
not share Christian beliefs. At one point, relying heavily on the work of 
Elaine Pagels, he describes the Gospels as follows:
According to Pagels, all four Gospels function as how-to manuals enabling 
local congregations to function as adaptive units. The instructions are en-
coded in the historical narratives, which makes all four Gospels suspect as 
literal history. Narratives designed to motivate behavior are free to omit, dis-
tort, and make up facts whenever necessary. The Four Gospels differ from 
each other, not because they were separated in time, but because they were 
designed to serve the needs of different Christian churches scattered across 
the Roman Empire. They are a fossil record of cultural adaptation at an ex-
tremely fine scale. Just as upstream and downstream guppy populations 
evolved to be different in response to the presence and absence of preda-
tors, the instructions provided by the four Gospels evolved to be different 
in response to differences in the social environments inhabited by the early 
Christian Congregations.36
No doubt such an analysis of the Gospels appears to be inconsistent with 
some Christian faith traditions and would fairly be taken as an attack on 
the very foundations of these traditions. However, it is especially with 
regard to these claims that one must carefully distinguish what Wilson 
himself seems to believe about the claims of religion, whether Christian 
or other, and what strictly speaking his theoretical account warrants, if 
successful in its terms.
Like the Simon case, however, it is an open question as to whether 
Wilson is really even making the claims that Plantinga assigns him: that 
is, that “religion is essentially a means of social control employing or in-
volving fictitious belief”37 and that “religious belief isn’t reality oriented.”38 
In fact, there is good reason to believe that Wilson remains agnostic on the 
truth-value of religious belief across the board. Wilson makes an important 
distinction between factual and practical realism. Factual realism in the 
case of religious beliefs refers to the degree to which the particular beliefs 
correspond to literal descriptions of the world. Practical realism refers to 
Taken together these statements are consistent with Wilson’s commitment to methodological 
naturalism as a means to understanding religion scientifically.
36Pagels, The Origin of Satan, 207–208.
37Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 138.
38Ibid., 151.
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the behavioral adaptiveness of various beliefs—that is, the degree to which 
a set of beliefs motivates behaviors that are adaptive in the real world. 
On an evolutionary account of religious belief, practical realism becomes 
the “gold standard” by which rationality is judged. The factual reality 
of particular beliefs may indeed become irrelevant. But no judgment is 
necessary regarding the factual reality of religious beliefs on Wilson’s ac-
count, although even the Christian would have to acknowledge that not 
all practically realistic (i.e., functional) religious belief systems correspond 
to factual reality.
In fact, Wilson’s theory is one that would be very compatible with 
Christian belief if we accept it within its limited scope.39 Wouldn’t we ex-
pect a world that God created to be structured such that religious belief 
would in fact pay off in very pragmatic ways, exactly the ways that Wilson 
suggests: satisfying the basic, fundamental physical and psychological 
needs of individuals within society? So, like the Simon case, rather than 
there being conflict between Wilson’s theory and Christian belief, there 
may in fact be deep concord. Wilson’s theory ultimately may work better 
within a Christian worldview than a naturalistic worldview, given that the 
function of religion according to Wilson would not be surprising from a 
Christian perspective.
Also important to note here is Wilson’s suggestion that science as a 
unifying system (science here defined as a system devoted exclusively to 
the pursuit of factual realism) may fail at the level of practical realism in 
that were we to accept it within all spheres of human activity, society may 
actually be less adaptive.
[M]uch religious belief does not represent a form of mental weakness but 
rather the healthy functioning of the biologically and culturally well-adapt-
ed human mind. . . . [F]actual realists detached from practical reality were 
not among our ancestors. It is the person who elevates factual truth above 
practical truth who must be accused of mental weakness from an evolution-
ary perspective.40
It follows that the values of scientific society do not suffice for the society as 
a whole. They must be supplemented with other values that place a greater 
emphasis on practical realism and that hopefully apply to all members of 
the society as moral equals.41
Again, there is deep concord here between Wilson’s theory and Christian 
belief. If we take Wilson at face value here, a case could be made that 
science as a system may operate best within a wider Christian/theistic/
religious worldview. Factual realism may serve adaptive functions within 
a larger system of values and practices that are more geared toward prac-
tical realism.
39Plantinga himself acknowledges as much in his discussion of the possibility of a 
“(Wilson)-minus” (Where the Conflict Really Lies, 142–143).
40Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral, 228.
41Ibid., 231.
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Plantinga’s focus on Wilson’s evolutionary account of religion is part 
of a more general critique of evolutionary accounts of religion. But the 
reason he spends more time with Wilson is that the apparent conflict be-
tween Wilson and Christian belief runs deeper than the other accounts 
addressed by Plantinga. Prior to his focus on Wilson, Plantinga discusses 
the work of the following thinkers: Rodney Stark, Michael Ruse and E. 
O. Wilson, Pascal Boyer, Scott Atran, and Stewart Guthrie. In all of these 
cases, however, Plantinga comes to a conclusion that is similar to the con-
clusion we ultimately reach in the Wilson case. That is, that the theories 
these authors propose include unnecessary meta-theoretical add-ons that, 
when eliminated, erase any apparent conflict between the proposed theory 
and Christian belief. For example, both Stark and Boyer suggest religion 
is a spandrel of rational thought that for Stark leads people to attempt to 
negotiate “nonexistent goods” (e.g., eternal life) from “non existent super-
natural agents.”42 For Boyer, as reported by Plantinga, religion springs 
from “a family of cognitive phenomena involving ‘counterintuitive’ 
beings (beings who act in ways counter to our ordinary categories)”43 such 
as invisible beings who can act in the world. According to Atran, “religion 
is (1) a community’s costly and hard-to-fake commitment (2) to a counter-
factual and counterintuitive world of supernatural agents (3) who master 
people’s existential anxieties such as death and deception.”44 But in these 
three cases Plantinga recognizes that apart from the “gratuitous” coun-
terfactuals, there is nothing in Boyer, Atran, or Stark that is inconsistent 
with Christian belief.45 A similar move is made in regard to E. O. Wilson 
and Michael Ruse’s claim that “ethics is an illusion fobbed off on us by our 
own genes to get us to cooperate,”46 and that “humans function better if 
they are deceived by their genes into thinking there is a disinterested ob-
jective morality binding upon them, which they should obey.”47 Again in 
this case Plantinga recognizes that simply removing the theoretically un-
necessary claims that “ethics is an illusion” and that “belief in an objective 
morality is a deception” leaves the theory essentially intact and removes 
any apparent conflict between the theory and Christian belief.
The case of Stewart Guthrie hinges on the validity of the process by 
which we come to form beliefs about agency. Guthrie sees religious beliefs 
42This characterization of Stark (found on 137–138 and 142 of Where the Conflict Really Lies) 
comes directly from Wilson’s summary of Stark found in Darwin’s Cathedral, 48. It is impor-
tant to note here that in the work cited by Wilson (Stark, “Micro Foundations of Religion”), 
Stark never characterizes the supernatural agents referenced in religious belief systems as 
“non-existent” or “imaginary.”
43Boyer, Religion Explained.
44Atran, In Gods We Trust, 4, quoted in Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 139.
45Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 140.
46Ruse and Wilson, “The Evolution of Ethics,” 310, quoted in Plantinga, Where the Conflict 
Really Lies, 134.
47Ruse and Wilson, “Moral Philosophy as Applied Science,” 179, quoted in Plantinga, 
Where the Conflict Really Lies, 134.
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as the result of a hypersensitive agency detection device (aka HADD).48 
Because of its hypersensitivity it will deliver many false positives, 
meaning we are prone to mistakenly attribute agency to objects or entities 
in our environments that are not in fact agents. The assumption is that 
false positives are less costly than false negatives, e.g., failing to attribute 
agency to an object that could potentially do us great harm, such as a very 
hungry tiger. But as Plantinga points out, this theory does not discredit 
belief in supernatural agents or render such beliefs irrational just because 
they were induced by HADD. Since HADD delivers true beliefs as well as 
false, there is no reason to believe that any particular belief (including the 
belief in a supernatural agent) is false simply because it was produced by 
HADD. This distinguishes Guthrie from Wilson, in that Plantinga reads 
Wilson as claiming that the belief producing mechanisms involved in reli-
gious beliefs are not aimed at the production of true belief.
Wilson then appears to be in deeper conflict with Christian belief than 
any of the other cases Plantinga addresses. But what we have shown is 
that in the first place it is not clearly the case that Wilson makes the strong 
claim Plantinga attributes to him. For example, Wilson does claim that 
“many religious beliefs are false as literal descriptions of the real world,”49 
but he also recognizes that many non-religious belief systems also “distort 
the facts of the real world.”50 But even if we attribute the strong claim to 
Wilson, any apparent conflict with Christian belief is erased with a slight 
adjustment to the alleged claim, i.e., that the belief-producing mecha-
nisms involved in religious belief are not necessarily truth-aimed. Such an 
adjustment leaves the theory’s explanatory power intact and removes an 
unnecessary metatheoretical claim, i.e., a claim that lies beyond the reach 
of science operating within the constraints of methodological naturalism.
Simonian Science and the Christian: Moving Forward
While we have argued that Simon’s theory of altruism and Wilson’s evo-
lutionary account of religion are not in conflict, superficially or otherwise, 
with Christian belief, what does Plantinga suggest we do if there were real 
(yet superficial) conflict between science and genuine tenets of Christian 
faith? Does he suggest that the Christian should ignore good science and 
hold the faith beliefs to be untouchable? Should she hold that claims in 
science that do conflict with Christian faith must simply be denied as false 
if in conflict with known truths of faith? Sensibly, Plantinga does not rec-
ommend either option. One option would be to set up a parallel scientific 
enterprise where the commitments of Christian faith play a role as part 
of the so-called evidence base. This has been defended by Plantinga in 
a prior set of papers.51 He argued that Christians might pursue what he 
48Guthrie, Faces in the Clouds.
49Wilson, Darwin’s Cathedral, 228.
50Ibid.
51Plantinga, “Methodological Naturalism, Part 1” and “Methodological Naturalism, Part 2.”
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called “Augustinian” science as an alternative to the prevailing approach 
to science committed to methodological naturalism. In his recent book 
he has not pursued this course, but also has not simply disavowed it as 
a non-starter.52 The strategy he adopts is similar in certain respects, but 
retreats to a safer place by not attempting to claim the mantle of science. 
He relies on the work he has done to defend the right of Christians to 
claim knowledge with respect to Christian faith and that such knowledge 
provides a wider evidence base than the truncated evidence set of meth-
odologically naturalistic science. A Christian may discern that while the 
claims of Simonian science might appear quite plausible given the nar-
rower evidence set of science limited by a commitment to methodological 
naturalism (MN), they may well not be plausible with respect to her wider 
evidence set. In such cases, Simonian science does not provide a defeater 
for Christian faith.
So, is it a good idea for Christians to pursue science under the guide-
lines of MN? Plantinga’s prior answer was: sometimes yes, sometimes no. 
To get clearer on what this discussion might involve, let’s look at how he 
understands MN. “According to MN, the data model of a proper scien-
tific theory will not invoke God or other supernatural agents or employ 
what one knows or thinks one knows by way of revelation.”53 A theory 
as well cannot include reference to the supernatural in its actual postula-
tions or appeal to what one knows or believes via revelation. Nor will such 
science include in the evidence base beliefs entailed by the existence of su-
pernatural beings and propositions about them or by revelation, e.g., the 
doctrines of the Incarnation or Atonement. “Hence, rejecting, for example, 
Herbert Simon’s theory of altruism because it is massively improbable with 
respect to a Christian evidence base would presumably not be proper sci-
ence—not at least, if proper science involves methodological naturalism.”54 
Rather than question MN as a proper limit on science, Plantinga adopts a 
more defensible, and in many ways quite reasonable strategy of arguing 
that the evidence base available to a practicing scientist in her tool of argu-
ments within science does not equal the Christian’s evidence base.55 This 
change in strategy takes more seriously his philosophical defense of war-
ranted Christian belief insofar as he sees no need to invoke science to gain 
epistemic credibility.
In Where the Conflict Really Lies, Plantinga has taken a step in the right 
direction to dampen the fears of conflict between science and faith. Un-
fortunately, the way he invokes Simonian science still suggests that we 
52Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 190.
53Ibid., 172.
54Ibid., 173.
55The Christian may very well claim here that Simon’s account is highly limiting as an 
understanding of altruism and other moral behaviors. After all, the Christian would want to 
give credence to the influence of the Holy Spirit as a motivating force in a person’s decision 
to help and care for others. We would agree. But as long as Simon’s account remains within 
its limited scope there is no conflict with Christian belief. 
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should be expecting conflict in a class of contemporary science, namely 
evolutionary psychology, where such is arguably not the case. Finally, 
he raises the question of whether Christians should simply respond to 
claims of genuine conflict by judging the plausibility of such claims to be 
low according to their wider evidence base. His answer to this is “no, not 
necessarily” but the explanation is somewhat frustrating. He goes on at 
some length to explain how such a negotiation might go in his discussion 
of “Faith and Reason”56 and the “Reduction Test.”57 But at the end of the 
day it amounts to this: beliefs of faith may be revised, but it would take 
a lot of evidence to warrant revision and, if such beliefs are held as basic 
(warranted straightaway), this counterevidence would need to be very 
significant. Again it is helpful to remind us that good science (i.e., science 
that has gathered sufficient evidence, has had a record of explanatory suc-
cess, and has genuinely garnered the basis for claiming it has the truth 
even about what goes beyond observation) can help us revise some of our 
faith beliefs.
Another issue here that deserves attention is the extent to which 
metatheoretical claims in general and Christian beliefs in particular come 
into direct contact with scientific theorizing, at least if scientists remain 
within the confines of MN in their work as scientists. We suggest it is 
doubtful that Christian metatheory plays a role in scientific theorizing. 
For example, Plantinga suggests Simonian science, even if successful sci-
ence, would not be a defeater for:
(B) Mother Teresa was perfectly rational in behaving in that altruistic 
manner.58
According to Plantinga, the reason Simonian science would not be a de-
feater for (B) is that Simonian science is unlikely to be true given the other 
propositions in the Christian’s arsenal (evidence base) such as that “human 
beings have been created by God and created in his image” etc.59 We argue 
Simonian science is not a defeater for (B) because this claim is not, in fact, 
in conflict with Simon’s theory. But Plantinga’s claim also flounders on the 
vagueness of what it means to be created in God’s image. Without some 
fairly well spelled out theory/theology of “image bearing,” it is not clear at 
all that Simonian science, even on Plantinga’s understanding, is in conflict 
with Christian beliefs regarding imago Dei, especially if one also takes the 
fall seriously. Simonian science (operating within the constraints of MN) 
is unlikely to be a defeater of any truly significant Christian belief because 
those Christian beliefs are stated at such a level of abstraction that they never 
clearly come into contact with the particular claims of Simonian science.
56Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, 178.
57Ibid., 186.
58Ibid., 186.
59Ibid., 187.
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That Christian control beliefs operate so weakly in the Simon case, a 
case that several Christian thinkers see as in direct conflict with Christian 
beliefs, may in part explain why there are no strong research programs 
coming out of the Christian tradition, as Wolterstorff calls for in Reason 
within the Bounds of Religion. It may simply be the case that Christian 
metatheoretical assumptions are too abstract and indeterminate to operate 
strongly at the level of theory construction and evaluation. The claim here 
is not that metatheories have nothing to say about theory construction and 
evaluation. But perhaps that relationship is not as direct and restrictive as 
seems to be suggested by Plantinga and others.
Plantinga is on the right track to argue that the evolutionary claims of 
Simon and David Sloan Wilson are, at most, in superficial conflict with 
Christian faith. And he is right to argue that the partisans of such areas 
of science, such as evolutionary explanations of religion, can sometimes 
fall prey to the temptation of overreaching interpretation. However, given 
the long history of conflict, it seems wise to restrict the “conflict” call to 
very clear cases. In this instance, Plantinga’s claim about evolutionary psy-
chology fails to meet that standard.60
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